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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana and the Gulf Coast began
the long march to recovery. Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural
disaster in American history,1 resulting in approximately i5oo deaths in
Louisiana alone2 and sparking a human displacement unrivaled since the Dust
Bowl migration of the 193os. 3 Although the Category 3 storm inflicted
significant damage along the entire Gulf Coast, its wrath was felt most acutely
in the city of New Orleans, where massive flooding overwhelmed poorly
constructed levees and drowned vast stretches of the city.
4
Katrina's primary victims were New Orleans's most vulnerable citizens -
those who could not afford to evacuate or who had homes in low-lying areas
hit hardest by the flooding.' Renters6 and African-American residents7 were
1. See THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2006)
[hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED].
2. See, e.g., Michelle Hunter, Deaths of Evacuees Push Toll to 1,577: Out-of-State Victims Mostly
Elderly, Infirm, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 19, 2006, at Al; La. Dep't of Health &
Hosps., Reports of Missing and Deceased (Aug. 2, 20o6), http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/
offices/page.asp ?ID= 192&Detail=5248.
3. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 1, at 8; Timothy Egan, Uprooted and Scattered Far from the
Familiar, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. il, 2005, § 1, at 1.
4. The flooding made much of New Orleans uninhabitable. According to one estimate, after
Katrina, the city's population plummeted from 460,000 to 171,ooo. Adam Nossiter, Bit by
Bit, Some Outlines Emerge for a Shaken New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at Al.
s. See Christopher Tidmore, The Unusual Nature of Nagin's Victory, LA. WKLY., May 29, 2006,
at 1 ("While Caucasian Lakeview received the bulk of the initial flooding, most of the
damaged areas of New Orleans were predominately Black. With the exception of Lakeview,
whites tended to live on the higher plane of the Mississippi River Ridge .... African-
Americans lived in the low lying, newer sections of New Orleans, which took the brunt of
the storm's damage when the floodwalls... ruptured....").
6. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief para. 4, at 2, Ass'n of
Cmtys. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Blanco, No. o6-611 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2006)
[hereinafter Class Action Complaint], available at http://www.loyno.edu/~quigley/
blanco.pdf (noting that "more than half' of the 354,000 people who lived in areas that
received moderate to severe damage were renters).
7. See id. para. 33, at 8 ("In four of the six neighborhoods that suffered the worst Katrina
related damage, over 8o% of the population is African-American. African-Americans resided
in approximately 72% of the homes that flooded over six feet."); Shaila Dewan et al.,
Evacuees' Lives Still Upended Seven Months After Hurricane, N.Y. TIME, Mar. 22, 2006, at Al
(noting that white evacuees were less likely than black evacuees to have depleted their
savings, to have been forced to borrow money, or to have lost their jobs as a result of the
storm); see also John R. Logan, The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged
Neighborhoods 1, http://www.s4.brown.edu/katrina/report.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2007)
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particularly harmed; African-Americans constituted the majority of the
displaced and, in the post-disaster period, tended to live farther away from
New Orleans than white evacuees.8 Although many sought refuge in nearby
cities like Baton Rouge, Katrina's "diaspora"9 scattered most residents to cities
outside of Louisiana, such as Houston and Atlanta.1"
Against this backdrop of devastation, Louisiana's political leaders were
charged with the unprecedented task of conducting elections with a displaced
electorate. For generations, the state's political system existed in an uneasy
partisan and racial balance, with black voters often determining the outcomes
of state and federal elections." New Orleans, with a population that was 67%
African-American,' 2 was the center of minority political power in Louisiana.
But Katrina struck a deep blow to the city's minority electorate: between 27%
and 48% of Orleans Parish voters were displaced, and of these voters, 75% were
black.'3 With New Orleans's first post-Katrina municipal elections scheduled to
take place in February 2006, and with rising speculation of an impending racial
and political realignment,' 4 the Louisiana State Legislature began the highly
contested process of developing new voting rules for a devastated democracy.
("[T]he storm's impact was disproportionately borne by the region's African American
community, by people who rented their homes, and by the poor and unemployed.").
8. Bruce Eggler, Evacuees Can Vote Absentee or in La.; Judge Rules Against Out-of-State Polling,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 25, 20o6, at Al.
9. Matthew Ericson, Katrina's Diaspora, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, S I, at 24 (providing both
data and a graphical display of displaced residents).
lo. See HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE PROJECT, APPLESEED, A CONTINUING STORM: THE ON-
GOING STRUGGLES OF HURRICANE KATRINA EVACUEES 1 (2o6).
11. See Democrats Focus on Louisiana Races: Next Governor Will Be Unique; Breaux Mulls Senate
Decision, CNN.coM, Nov. 7, 2003, http://www.cnn.con/2oo3/ALLPOLITICS/n/o7/
elec04.louisiana/ ("A key to the outcome of the race could be the black vote, particularly in
the city of New Orleans, where a heavy Democratic tide secured Landrieu's margin of
victory last year."); see also Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, para. 26, at 7 ("Over 32%
of Louisiana's population is African American.").
12. The black population percentage is based on data from the 2000 census. See Greater New
Orleans Cmty. Data Ctr., Orleans Parish: People & Household Characteristics (July 31,
20o6), http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/people. html.
13. Press Release, Advancement Project, Louisiana State Officials Sued for Violation of the
Voting Rights Act (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/press-
releases/20o6/0209o6.html.
14. See, e.g., Sylvia Moreno, Displaced Voters Make Wishes Known for New Orleans: Primary
Election for Mayor Is April 22, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2006, at A3 (quoting one displaced
resident as saying that black voters "want to be a part of the rebuilding and have a voice in
selecting someone who wants us back, because there's a lot of people in New Orleans that's
trying to keep us out"); Peter Whoriskey, Nagin Among Front-Runners in New Orleans,
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Because of its deep history of racially discriminatory politics," Louisiana
must - in developing voting rules - comply with section 5, the most celebrated
and controversial provision of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965. 6 Section 5
requires Louisiana and other "covered jurisdictions"'' 7 to preclear all changes in
their voting laws with either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a special
three-judge district court in Washington, D.C., before the changes take effect.'
8
The provision was originally crafted in response to the persistent and creative
tactics employed by covered jurisdictions to avoid federal civil rights
mandates. 9 By demanding preclearance for all voting changes-from the
seemingly insignificant and uncontested, to the most critical and
controversial- section 5 enlists the federal government as a constant chaperone
in matters of state election administration.
The test used to enforce section 5, which I will call the "static
benchmarking" test," was conceived by the Supreme Court in Beer v. United
States to ward off voting changes that would result in a "retrogression" in
minority voters' "effective exercise of the electoral franchise."'" The static
benchmarking procedure detects movements in minority political power by
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2oo6, at A9 (quoting one political scientist as saying, "in blunt terms,
some white voters see this as an opportunity to take back power").
is. For background on Louisiana's history of race relations, see Judge Wisdom's extensive
recounting in United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963). In addition to
being the first state to enact the notorious Grandfather Clause invalidated in Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), Louisiana passed the railcar statute at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), and was home to the infamous David Duke, the longtime Ku Klux Klan
leader, who won the majority of the white vote in three state-wide elections, see D. Stephen
Voss, Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New South, 58 J. POL. 1156, 1156
(1996). See generally Richard L. Engstrom et al., Louisiana, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH: THE IMpACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT, 1965-199o, at 103 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
16. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Star. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 19 73bb-i
(2000)).
17. See infra note 37.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
1g. See, e.g., Armand Derfiner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's
Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785, 791 (2006) ("Voting
discrimination was . . . as resilient as the many-headed hydra, with new disenfranchising
methods repeatedly sprouting up in place of the ones most recently removed.").
20. Commentators have used other terms to describe the test that enforces section s. See, e.g.,
Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J.
139, 140 (1984) (calling it "the retrogression test").
21. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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comparing a proposed voting change to the existing voting laws in the
jurisdiction seeking preclearance. If, applied to the current circumstances, the
proposed law increases minority political power relative to the existing law, it is
deemed "ameliorative" and is precleared.22 If the proposed law diminishes
minority political power, it is deemed "retrogressive" and is permanently
enjoined from taking effect. 3 The static comparison thus guards against the
crumbling of minority political power under the weight of new, retrogressive
laws and ensures that, in the face of a retrogressive proposal, the status quo
ante holds firm. 4
Despite its unrivaled success in advancing and protecting minority political
gains,"5 section 5 quietly suffered one of its most disappointing failures in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as the static benchmarking test fell apart.
Critically, static benchmarking assumes that current laws are capable of
preserving existing minority political power;, 6 indeed, it is the step that
completes the test's "sixth-grade arithmetic."27  Katrina shattered this
22. Id.
23. Id. If a proposed voting change neither increases nor decreases minority voting strength, it is
also entitled to preclearance under section 5. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S.
125, 134 n.o (1983) ("[T]he Beer Court did not distinguish between ameliorative changes
and changes that simply preserved current minority voting strength. The Court explained
that the purpose of 55 was to prohibit only retrogressive changes.").
24. In this Note, I use the terms "minority political power," "minority voting power," and
"minority influence" interchangeably to refer to minority voters' "effective exercise of the
electoral franchise"-a concept that is inherently broad. Determining whether there has
been retrogression in minority voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise "depends
on an examination of all the relevant circumstances, such as the ability of minority voters to
elect their candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group's opportunity to participate
in the political process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive plan." Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003). Furthermore, "'[n]o single statistic provides courts with
a shortcut to determine whether' a voting change retrogresses from the benchmark." Id. at
480 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,1020-21 (1994)).
25. For data on the impact of the VRA on Louisiana politics, see Engstrom et al., supra note 15,
at 103.
26. This assumption is quite common. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The
Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1211, 1214 (1998) (stating
that existing voting laws are often "beneficial procedures" for minority political power);
Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J.
21, 21 (2004) ("[S]ection 5 contains a natural benchmark that preserves the political gains
minority voters have achieved through political or legal action.").
27. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1710, 1713 (2004). Justice Stewart charged that the static benchmarking test
used "sixth-grade arithmetic" in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750
(1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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assumption and, in the process, vindicated Justice Thurgood Marshall's
prescient warning that static benchmarking "will not always be [able] to
determine whether a new plan increases or decreases Negro voting power
relative to the prior plan. ''2s Marshall was concerned that in some contexts, a
proposed law might always appear "positive-no matter how good or bad the
result. 29
Hurricane Katrina provided a perfect example of what Justice Marshall
feared. The massive human displacement and immense election infrastructure
damage caused by the storm rendered Louisiana's existing voting laws
inadequate to conduct post-disaster elections: the number of absentee voters
swelled, and those who remained in New Orleans lacked water, electricity, and
stable shelter, much less access to polling locations and the Postal Service." ° If
Louisiana held a post-Katrina election with the pre-Katrina voting laws,
minority voting power would collapse; 31 only aggressive procedural reforms
could avoid this outcome. Yet when.the state sought to preclear its emergency
voting reforms, the static, benchmarking test stubbornly relied on the
inadequate pre-Katrina voting plan as a valid benchmark for comparison.
Conceptually, this meant that compared to the broken pre-Katrina benchmark,
almost any proposed law would appear ameliorative and would merit
preclearance. A covered jurisdiction could therefore enact reforms that, despite
improving existing laws, stopped far short of providing minority voters with
the realistic opportunity to maintain their voting strength. 2 Simply put,
Hurricane Katrina revealed a blind spot in section 5's enforcement powers.
This Note shines a critical light on section 5's post-Katrina failure and
suggests a narrowly tailored doctrinal "fix" to repair the provision. The
proposed model replaces the static benchmarking test with a more flexible
counterpart that I call "dynamic benchmarking." Instead of automatically using
existing voting laws as a benchmark, this procedure employs a multifactor
examination to ensure that the current regime is actually capable of preserving
minority political power. In the absence of a suitable existing benchmark, the
dynamic test offers a "replacement benchmark" -a model voting plan that, if
used after a disaster, would likely preserve minority influence. The replacement
28. Beer, 425 U.S. at 153 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 154 n.12.
30. See Peter Henderson, New Orleans Mayor Radiates Optimism Among the Ruins, BOSTON.COM,
Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2oo6/o9/o4/new-Orleans_
mayor radiates optimism among-the-ruins/?page= full.
31. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Section II.B for a discussion that explains this phenomenon in greater detail.
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benchmark thus resurrects section 5's coercive power; if a covered jurisdiction
proposes a post-disaster voting plan that is less robust than the replacement
benchmark, preclearance will be denied.33
The discussion that follows proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces
section 5 and outlines its development. It then details the contours of the static
benchmarking test that has long defined section 5's administration. Part II
recounts for the first time the post-Katrina preclearance process and diagnoses
section 5's inability to adapt to the unprecedented challenges posed by Katrina.
Part III unveils the dynamic benchmarking model and argues that it is both
necessary and justified to remedy section 5's weaknesses. Finally, the
Conclusion calls on Congress to amend section 5 and to incorporate dynamic
benchmarking as an alternative to the current static procedure. In addition to
presenting traditional arguments for congressional action, it departs from
doctrine to provide an alternative justification for the model I offer.
I. AN "UNCOMMON" ENFORCEMENT TOOL
A. Two Generations of Section 5
Since its enactment in 1965, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has proven
to be the nation's most innovative and successful civil rights enforcement tool.
The provision's history is aptly divided into two "generations" of enforcement:
the first generation focused primarily on providing equal access to the ballot
box, while the second generation has been concerned with eradicating more
subtle barriers to minority political empowerment. This Section briefly
considers each generation in turn.
The first generation of section 5 enforcement occurred in response to the
"unremitting and ingenious" tactics employed by certain states and localities -
33. Although the merits of this proposal are discussed more fully infra Section 11.A, it is in part
attractive because it takes no particular position in the longstanding debate on section 5's
merit, attempting only to fortify a central pillar of voting rights law. Most voting rights
scholars who have participated in this debate are supportive of section 5's continued
existence and effectiveness, but some are either openly skeptical or clearly opposed to the
provision. Richard H. Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff can be counted as section 5's most
notable skeptics. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 27; Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court,
2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 29
(2004). Other commentators, like Abigail Thernstrom, have been deeply critical of DOJ's
section 5 administration and have called for allowing section S to expire. See, e.g., Abigail
Thernstrom, More Notes from a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911, 919-31 (1995); Abigail
Thernstrom, Op-Ed., Emergency Exit, N.Y. SUN, July 29, 2005, at io; Abigail Thernstrom &
Edward Blum, Op-Ed., Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at Aio.
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mostly in the former Confederacy-to deny black citizens the right to vote
despite contrary federal mandates.14  Prior congressional attempts to
enfranchise black voters had generally been ignored by recalcitrant
jurisdictions, and "[i]n those relatively few instances when a court actually
enjoined a discriminatory practice, the affected jurisdiction would simply adopt
a new exclusionary tactic not covered by the court order-sometimes within
twenty-four hours."3 To thwart the "outguess[ing]" of congressional and
judicial mandates, 36 section 5 forced covered jurisdictions7 to obtain
preclearance from the DOJ or a declaratory judgment from a special three-
judge district court in the District of Columbia before a new voting law could
take effect. The covered jurisdiction maintained the burden of proving that its
proposed voting laws would not disadvantage minority voters. Until convinced
otherwise' 8 the federal government would presume that the jurisdiction's
proposed changes either reflected a racially discriminatory intent or would
produce a racially discriminatory effect. Section 5 thus cast a decidedly skeptical
eye on all voting changes in covered jurisdictions. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Supreme Court blessed this "uncommon"39 enforcement
structure-and its departure from federal deference to the states in election
administration- so that the nation could finally "shift the advantage of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of [voting discrimination] to its victims.
'40
The focus on ensuring equal access to the ballot resulted in immediate success,
evidenced by dramatic increases in minority registration and political
participation throughout covered jurisdictions.
4'
34. See South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
35. Tokaji, supra note 19, at 791.
36. Allen v. State Bd. ofElections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969).
37- When the VRA was passed, a jurisdiction could become "covered" if: (1) it employed
literacy tests, and (2) less than so% of its voting-age population was registered to vote by, or
eventually voted in, the 1964 presidential election. Additional districts were added to the
coverage list during the 1968 and 1982 congressional reauthorizations of the VRA's
temporary provisions. See Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, About Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec-5/about.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2007) [hereinafter Civil Rights Div., About Section 5]. Section 5 was further extended in
1975 to target jurisdictions that conducted English-only elections. See Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, About Language Minority Voting Rights, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/ sec_2o3/activ 203.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
38. See infra Section I.B.
39. 383 U.S. at 334.
40. Id. at 328.
41. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 15 (canvassing the impact of the
VRA on covered jurisdictions).
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Despite this first generation success, subtle structural barriers hindered the
growth of minority political power. Covered jurisdictions, fearing that
minority electoral victories would flow from increased minority political
participation, deployed seemingly race-neutral strategies to minimize the
electoral power of the newly enfranchised citizens.4' For instance, many
jurisdictions adopted laws mandating that all candidates win elections in "at-
large" districts, instead of in more localized, single-member districts. 43 This
kind of institutional design change effectively prevented minority voters from
forming electoral majorities in smaller districts where they were numerically
dominant.4
The retreat behind this race-neutral veil prompted the Supreme Court in
Allen v. State Board of Elections to broaden section 5's substantive reach to
consider "the subtle, as well as the obvious" roadblocks employed by covered
jurisdictions to frustrate minority political advancement.4' The Court
recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. ''46 Thus,
seemingly harmless voting changes that diminished minority voting power
were deemed just as illicit as outright vote denials. After Allen, stratagems such
as at-large districting changes, run-off requirements, and voter identification
laws required section 5 preclearance to ensure that they were not stalking
horses for discriminatory voting practices. In this so-called second generation
of section 5 enforcement, the provision has demonstrated its extraordinary
ability to advance and protect minority political power. Indeed, the move
toward a more robust vision for section 5 "was arguably of greater importance
in advancing black electoral opportunity than even the dismantling of literacy
tests.
4 7
42. See Tokaji, supra note 19, at 794 (noting the tactics used to keep "legislative bodies largely
segregated even after the VRA's enactment").
43. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (198o).
44. At-large elections contributed to the fact that "[t]en years after the enactment of the VRA,
the number of southern African American legislators was only about one-third of its peak
during Reconstruction." See Tokaji, supra note 19, at 793.
45. 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969).
46. Id. at 569.
47. Issacharoff, supra note 27, at 1729.
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B. The Beer Retrogression Standard
In a key 1976 decision, the Supreme Court unveiled the doctrinal standard
that has long guided section 5's administration. Beer v. United States 8 involved
the review of New Orleans's 1970 city council redistricting plan, which created
a black voting majority in one out of the city's five councilmanic districts. With
the existence of racial bloc voting, or the cleavage of voting patterns along
racial lines, this configuration meant that black voters would likely elect one
black representative to the council. The city's proposed plan stood in contrast
to the previous councilmanic plan, which included no districts with a black
voting majority and under which, predictably, no black candidate had won
election to the council.
The city of New Orleans first submitted its new plan to the Department of
Justice for administrative preclearance but was twice rebuffed after the DOJ
objected that the proposed plan would not give minorities adequate voting
strength-that is, strength in proportion to their population. 49 The city
subsequendy sought preclearance from the three-judge district court, which
also refused to sanction the new plan, holding that it had "the effect of
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."' The court noted that
the city's reapportionment plan realistically only provided minority voters with
the chance to elect one black representative to the five-person body, despite the
fact that black residents accounted for a substantially larger proportion of the
city's population."1 In other words, although the new plan was an improvement
over the previous plan, it was not good enough to merit preclearance.
The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court,52 arguing that the district
court applied an erroneous preclearance standard under section 5. A five-Justice
majority of the Court agreed and, in the process, declared that a plan would
merit preclearance as long as it did not "retrogress" minority political power.1
3
48. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
49. See id. at 135.
50. See id. at 136.
51. See id. at 136-38 (recounting the district court's reasoning).
52. Section 5 permits direct appeal to the Supreme Court for judicial preclearance decisions
made by the three-judge district court. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1973C (2000).
53. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 ("[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-
procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.").
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The Court's new "retrogression standard" 4 meant that a section 5 objection
would attach only if a proposed change left minority voters with less political
power than they had previously enjoyed. Under this standard, the Court found
that the voting change in Beer was clearly ameliorative. Compared to the
previous plan, which provided no minority representation, the new plan would
reasonably lead to the election of one minority council representative. The
city's failure to go further in its reapportionment plan was immaterial because,
with respect to minority political power, the new plan was clearly an
improvement over its predecessor.
Despite the Beer Court's assertion that the retrogression standard had
"always" been the lodestar of section 5 review, 5 it relied on a thin slice of the
VRA's legislative history to justify its holding, 6 The Court cited a House of
Representatives report that declared that section 5 should detect whether
minority political power is "augmented, diminished, or not affected" by a
proposed law.17 Relying heavily on this legislative language, the Court
concluded that section 5 demanded a static comparison of a covered
jurisdiction's proposed and existing plans to detect impermissible movements
in minority power. The existing plan established a baseline or benchmark of
minority power against which new laws should be compared. s8 Changes that
augmented minority power relative to the existing plan would merit
preclearance; changes that diminished minority political power would not. 9
54. See, e.g., Meghann E. Donahue, Note, "The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated":
Administering Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1651, 1657 (2004).
55. 4 25 U.S. at 141.
s6. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 20, at 143 (calling the Court's reading of the legislative history
"highly interpretive"). Justice Marshall took issue with the Beer Court's reading of the
VRA's legislative history in City of Lockhart v. United States, 46o U.S. 125, 144-45 (1983)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 6o (1975)).
s8. The Beer Court permitted an existing law to be used as a benchmark, even if that meant
retrogression was a logical impossibility in the jurisdiction. In other words, if a jurisdiction
provided no minority representation under an existing voting regime, the benchmark would
be set at zero. Thus, a jurisdiction could conceivably gain preclearance for new laws that
perpetually denied minority voters the chance to elect a minority representative. This less
than charitable interpretation of section 5 has been vigorously criticized by four Justices,
who, speaking through Justice Souter, argued that "the full legislative history shows beyond
any doubt just what the unqualified text of§ 5 provides.... [T]he preclearance requirement
was not enacted to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old poison into new bottles."
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish 11), 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
59. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
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With the static benchmarking test, section 5 thus established a "one-way
ratchet" for minority political power. 6o
Since Beer, the Court has consistently relied on the static test to enforce the
retrogression standard and the "limited substantive" role it grants section 5.6i
Read as a whole, the Court's section 5 jurisprudence stands for a simple
proposition: the retrogression standard, properly applied, promises only that
minority voters will be protected from an impermissible "backsliding" in their
political power.62 So understood, the animating concern of section 5 is the
preservation, not the advancement or maximization, of minority voting
strength. 6' As I demonstrate later, the static test failed to uphold even this
limited retrogression standard in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Substantive criticisms aside,6 4  the inherent predictability of the
retrogression standard is one of section 5's longstanding strengths.
Jurisdictions know what is expected of them to clear the section 5 hurdle. The
unwavering retrogression standard allows section 5 to operate principally as a
deterrence tool-the "sword of Damocles" 65 - that curbs retrogressive laws
6o. Issacharoff, supra note 27, at 1711. This conception of the VRA borrows from the
constitutional "ratchet theory" discussed in a footnote in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 n.lo (1966). The constitutional ratchet theory holds that Congress, acting pursuant
to its enforcement powers, may never take action designed to "restrict, abrogate, or dilute"
constitutional rights. Id.; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(affirming the ratchet theory).
61. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 982 (1996). The retrogression standard and, by extension, the
static benchmarking test were upheld in City of Lockhart, 46o U.S. at 134 n.1o.
62. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 335.
63. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (rejecting the DOJ's practice of denying
preclearance to voting changes that increased, but did not maximize, minority political
power); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish 1), 520 U.S. 471 (1997)
(ending the DOJ's longstanding practice of denying preclearance to voting changes that
likely violated section 2 of the VRA). In its recent VRA reauthorization, Pub. L. No. lo9-
246, 120 Stat. 577 (20o6), Congress overturned two of the Court's section 5 decisions, Bossier
Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, and Georgia v. Ashcrofi, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), that seemed to narrow
the Beer retrogression standard. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 15 (20o6) ("The[se] changes
work together and are designed to protect minorities from purposeful, unconstitutional
discrimination and to eliminate potential obstacles to minority representation in elected
bodies. With regard to redistricting plans, they protect naturally occurring districts that
have a clear majority of minority voters.").
64. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REv.
1179, 1198 (2001) (questioning the Beer Court's interpretation of the VRA's legislative
history); Haddad, supra note 20 (same).
65. Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach,
io6 COLUM. L. REV. 708,709 (2006).
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even before submission to the DOJ.6 6 A preclearance denial serves a powerful
shaming function,67 as rejection is a publicly announced indictment that a
covered jurisdiction's democratic process is tainted by racial discrimination.
Historical data tracking preclearance submissions attest to the provision's
deterrent power. The majority of voting changes are crafted "in the shadow of
section 5" and are therefore easily precleared.68 Others are quickly amended
after the fact to address concerns expressed by the DOJ. Functioning in this
manner, the preclearance process lends the DOJ coercive power and the ability
to negotiate with a covered jurisdiction from a position of strength.6 9 Unless a
jurisdiction is willing to endure the more onerous judicial preclearance process,
DOJ review is the final word on whether a proposed plan ever becomes law.
7°
II. THE POST-KATRINA PRECLEARANCE PROCESS
This Part turns to a previously unexplored breakdown in section 5's
enforcement powers. It recounts Louisiana's contentious post-Katrina
66. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81
DENY. U. L. REV. 225, 259 (2003) ("The deterrence factor, though, represents Section 5's
greatest influence in the prevention of unconstitutional voting-related discrimination.
Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 are acutely aware of the need to garner federal approval.
For example, in the context of redistricting, discussion and debate at the state and local level
often focuses on how the Department of Justice will view the changes made.").
67. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 721 n.43 (discussing section 5 as a "shaming" device).
68. See Karlan, supra note 26, at 36. Every year, the DOJ reviews between 15,ooo and 24,ooo
voting changes. Civil Rights Div., About Section 5, supra note 37. Of these changes, only a
handful are denied preclearance. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power To Renew the
Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,
192 (2005) (noting a decline, from 4.06% in 1968-1972 to 0.05% in 1998-2002, in the
percentage of submissions denied preclearance).
69. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 52, 61 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). But see HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 88-89 (1982) (discussing the DOJ's
position of weakness in negotiations).
70. Though covered jurisdictions may obtain preclearance administratively from the DOJ or
judicially from the three-judge district court, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions opt
for administrative preclearance. Compared to judicial preclearance, administrative review
offers a faster, less expensive method of obtaining preclearance. The DOJ only has sixty days
to grant or deny preclearance after the proposed change is submitted for review. If the sixty
days pass without a decision, the proposed change automatically takes effect. If the Voting
Section of the DOJ, which performs the bulk of the analysis and investigation during a
review, requires more information, it can submit a formal request that automatically resets
the sixty-day clock. See Civil Rights Div., About Section 5, supra note 37.
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preclearance process and ultimately diagnoses section 5 as doctrinally
unequipped to adapt to the post-Katrina challenge.
A. The Emergency Voting Plan
Operating without a historical model and under heightened public
scrutiny,71 the Louisiana government was charged with crafting an emergency
voting plan to respond to the damage caused by Katrina. After chronicling the
legislative battle to reform simple voting procedures, this Section details the
controversy surrounding a crucial point of contention: whether the state would
rely on traditional mail-based forms of absentee voting to accommodate
Katrina's displaced, or whether it would instead adopt a far-reaching "satellite
voting" measure that would allow the displaced to vote in person at polling
sites located around the country.72
Governor Kathleen Blanco began the post-Katrina reform process by taking
two decisive actions. First, she issued an executive order delaying New
Orleans's primary and general municipal elections, which were to be held in
February and March 2006, respectively.73 On its face, the executive order was
an honest admission that, months after Katrina hit, the city was still too
devastated to conduct a fair and safe election. 74
Second, the Governor convened two emergency sessions of the Louisiana
State Legislature-one in November 2005, and one in February 2006-to
consider new voting procedures for the post-disaster elections. The first
session was filled with pressing legislative reforms, and in her call to convene
the Governor suggested a series of election-related items for the legislature to
71. See, e.g., Letter from Bruce S. Gordon, President & Chief Executive Officer, NAACP, to
Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen. (Mar. 2, 20o6), available at http://www.
columbia.edu/itc/journalim/cases/katrina/NAACP/2oo6-0o3-o2%2oLetter%/2oto%2oGonzale
z.pdf; Letter from Bruce S. Gordon, President & Chief Executive Officer, NAACP, to John
K. Tanner, Chief of Voting Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 13, 2006),
available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/cases/katrina/NAACP/2oo6-o3-13%2o
Letter0/o2oto%2oTanner.pdf.
72. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
73, The primary election was moved to April 22, 2006. The general election was postponed to
May 20, 20o6. See La. Exec. Order No. KBB 2oo6-2 (Jan. 24, 20o6),
http ://www.legis.state.la.us/katrina/eoorders/o6-o2.pdf.
74. Cf id. at (justifying the delay based on the need to "minimize to whatever degree possible
a person[']s exposure to danger" and to "protect the integrity of the electoral process"
(quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:401.1 (Supp. 2006))).
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consider.7" One item asked the legislature to suspend the annual voter canvass,
a process mandated by state law to verify that all registered voters were still
residents of their home parishes. r6 A voter who had moved outside his home
parish and had, for instance, filed a change of address form with the Postal
Service could be declared ineligible and removed from the voter rolls. If it
remained in effect, the canvass could disqualify nearly all displaced voters who
were now living outside of New Orleans. 77 A second item sought the creation
of a framework statute to empower the state's chief election officer, the
Secretary of State, to formulate a logistical plan for post-disaster voting.78 Both
items were modest and uncontroversial and therefore easily passed the
legislature. 79
Despite the ease with which these reforms obtained approval, another
seemingly uncontroversial procedural reform-a bill introduced by a state
senator to relax a state law that prohibited first-time voters from voting
absentee in their first election-was defeated. 8° The legislature's rejection of
this proposal raised suspicions of its unwillingness to take aggressive steps to
help displaced residents participate in the elections. Preserving the first-time
absentee voter rule would bar nearly lo,ooo newly registered-and newly
displaced-voters from participating in New Orleans's municipal elections
unless they returned to the city to vote in person.8' At a hearing concerning the
75. See La. Proclamation No. 62 KBB 2005, Convening of Legislature in Extraordinary Session
(Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.legis.state.Ia.us/archive/o5les/call.pdf.
76. See id.
77. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:192 (2004) (requiring that the registrar mail an address
confirmation card to all registered voters, but that "[i]f the card is returned and ... if the
corrected address provided [by the Postal Service] is outside the parish, the registrar then
shall follow the procedure set forth in R.S. 18:193 with respect to challenge and cancellation
on the ground that the registrar has reason to believe that the registrant is no longer
qualified to be registered"). This law had the potential to disqualify those displaced by
Katrina, given that many filed change of address forms with the Postal Service that noted
their new, out-of-state addresses.
78. Cf La. Proclamation No. 62 KBB 2005, supra note 75 (empowering the extraordinary session
"[t]o legislate as to the holding of elections impaired as the result of a gubernatorially
declared disaster or emergency").
79. See LA. R.EV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1 9 2; id.§ 18:401.1.
8o. Senate Bill No. 6 failed to pass by a vote of sixteen yeas to twenty nays. See S. 6, 3 3 d
Extraordinary Sess., at 12-13 (La. 2005), available at http://senate.legis.state.Ia.us/
Sessionlnfo/2oos/ES/Journals/nl-1S-2005.pdf.
81. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, para. 29, at 8 ("[A]pproximately io,ooo displaced
Orleans Parish residents who have registered by mail to vote will be voting for the first time
in the April or May 2006 primary or general elections.").
1131
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
pace and scope of the state's election reforms,82 Judge Ivan Lemelle-the
presiding federal judge-brought up the legislature's rejection of the relaxed
absentee voter proposal "out of the blue" 81 and strongly hinted that if the
legislature did not reconsider its rejection, he was prepared "to take over [the]
elections. ',84 Likely motivated in part by this threat of judicial intervention, the
legislature adopted the absentee voting reform during the second emergency
session.8"
The legislature, however, refused to proceed with other voting reforms,
including a proposal that would have allowed displaced residents to vote early
at selected offices of the registrar outside of Orleans Parish. Although the
reform was considered a relatively uncontroversial precursor to more far-
reaching proposals preferred by some lawmakers and civil rights groups, the
legislature, voting along party and racial lines, rejected the provision.86 This
rejection prompted black lawmakers to walk out of the legislature in protest,
accusing the opposition of being motivated by racial animus and
opportunism.8 ' Following the walkout, one state senator commented that
82. A lawsuit, Wallace v. Chertoff, was originally filed in November 20o5 and sought the prompt
rescheduling of the 20o6 municipal elections and the immediate adoption of certain
procedural reforms for displaced voters. See Petition for Violation of the Voting Rights Act,
Deprivation of the Right To Vote, Violation of the Civil Rights Act & for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. o5-5519 (E.D. La. Nov. 1O, 2005) [hereinafter
Wallace Petition]. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) later signed on to Wallace as
counsel for the plaintiffs. See Press Release, NAACP-LDF, LDF Joins New Orleans Voting
Case (Jan. 20, 20o6), available at http://www.naacpldf org/printable.aspx?article=775. This
suit was later consolidated with another suit, ACORN v. Blanco, No. o6-61i (E.D. La. filed
Feb. 9, 2006).
83. Marsha Shuler, Courts May Take Over Election If Law Unchanged, Official Warns, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Feb. 3, 20o6, at 8A (quoting Louisiana Secretary of State Al Ater).
84. Id.
85. Senate Bill No. 16 passed by a vote of twenty-six yeas to twelve nays. See S. 16, 34th
Extraordinary Sess., at 13 (La. 2006), available at http://senate.legis.state.la.us/Sessionlnfo/
20o6/ES/Joumals/02-09-20o6.pdf.
86. See Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, http:/Albc.louisiana.gov/llbc members.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2006) (listing members of the Legislative Black Caucus); H. 14, 34 th
Extraordinary Sess., at 3-4 (La. 2006), available at http://house.louisiana.gov/Journals/
20o6_1stESJoumals/o61ES%20-%2oHJ%200213%20 7 .pdf (providing the final roll call); see
also Ed Anderson, Voting-Center Bill Gets Second Chance: Blanco Aides Say Tide Has Turned in
House, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 15, 2006, atA3 (noting the fifty-four votes cast
against an initial proposal for in-state satellite voting stations).
87. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 86.
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"[t] here are people who still don't want [black] people to vote."8 Marc Morial,
the former Mayor of New Orleans and president of the National Urban
League, called the walkout "unprecedented" and opined that "the act of the
legislature is tantamount to an act of disenfranchisement. I think it's an act that
borders on being a 21St century poll tax."
89
The protest dramatically raised the stakes by highlighting the legislature's
inaction. Judge Lemelle convened a conference call with state officials, warning
that the legislature's intransigence could "lead to the disenfranchisement of
Orleans Parish [v]oters" and could prompt him to intervene "[i]f the
legislature fails to deal with this issue in a manner that complies with federal
Voting Rights laws."9 ° Demonstrating once again that it responded best to the
threat of intervention, the legislature approved the early voting measure only
two days after first rejecting it. 9'
The legislature's hard line against seemingly uncontroversial reforms
chilled serious consideration of the principal voting reform sought by several
lawmakers and civil rights groups-the establishment of "satellite voting"
locations for displaced residents living outside the state. Instead of having
voters cast their ballots through the mail, the satellite procedure would allow
citizens to cast their votes in person at polling stations established in areas with
substantial concentrations of Katrina evacuees. 92 The Secretary of State
determined that satellite voting was logistically feasible93: Louisiana election
officials would staff the satellite locations with traditional voting equipment
and voter registration lists to reduce the potential for fraud. Satellite voting was
arguably the only remedy that would not disadvantage the hundreds of
thousands of minority voters living outside the state. In addition to the
88. Marsha Shuler, Legislators OK Letting Evacuees in La. Vote: Regional Voting Centers To Be Used
Outside N.O., ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Feb. 17, 2006, at 4A (quoting Louisiana Senator
Charles Jones).
89. Marc Morial, President, Nat'l Urban League, Address at the National Press Club Luncheon
(Feb. 14, 2006).
go. Minute Entry at 2, ACORN v. Blanco, No. o6-61i (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 20o6).
91. See La. H.R. Journal, 34th Extraordinary Sess., at 7 (Feb. 1S, 20o6), http://house.louisiana.gov/
Journals/2006lstESJouals/o6ES%2o-%2HJ%20021%/o209.pdf.
92. For a defense of satellite voting as an appropriate disaster-related voting procedure, see
Developments in the Law- Voting and Democracy, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1127, 1187-88 (2006).
93. Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, para. 5o, at 12 ("[T]he Secretary of State has
determined that it is feasible to conduct out-of-state satellite voting in the nine states that he
has identified as having the highest concentrations of displaced persons.").
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continuing breakdowns in the Postal Service,94 many of the displaced still
relied on temporary shelters, 9 and neither the state nor the federal government
could establish with exact precision the addresses of all registered voters
scattered by Katrina. 96  These structural deficiencies demonstrated the
inferiority of traditional mail-based voting methods relative to a satellite voting
alternative. Supporters of satellite voting bolstered their argument by pointing
out that it was a historically precedented voting procedure -soldiers in the
Civil War relied on satellite voting booths to vote absentee from the field 97 and,
more recently, Iraqi citizens living in the United States used satellite voting
locations to vote in their country's first postwar elections. 98 In addition,
94. See, e.g., Michelle Hunter, Local Mail Delivery Is Slowly Improving: But No Magazines Go to
ZIP Code 7Ol, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 5, 2006, at Ai (noting a five-month
delay in mail delivery); Michelle Hunter, Neither Rain Nor Sleet?: The Storm Has Passed, the
Cleanup Is Under Way and Local Residents Want at Least One Piece of Their Normal, Pre-
Katrina Lives Back: Their Mail, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 23, 2005, at Ai
(discussing the heavy infrastructure and personnel damage to the Postal Service that
persisted months after Katrina); Michelle Hunter & Sheila Grissett, Some Residents Find
They've Got Mail: Carriers May Delay Delivery If Address Looks Unsafe, Vacant, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 22, 2005, at Bi (noting initial postal delays immediately
after Katrina).
95. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Storm Evacuees Found To Suffer Health Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2006, at Ai (noting that, by April 2006, the average Katrina evacuee had moved 3.5 times).
Katrina evacuees also relied on private sources of shelter that were more efficient at
providing immediate help in the aftermath of the storm. See, e.g., HURRICANE KATRINA
RESPONSE PROJECT, supra note lo, at 1; Hamil R. Harris & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Churches
Still Await Katrina Aid: Bush-Clinton Fund Criticized for Delay in Allocating $20 Million,
WASH. POST., Mar. 2, 2006, at Alo.
96. Locating the displaced was extraordinarily difficult for the government. The Louisiana
Secretary of State relied heavily on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) list
to contact voters but had to threaten suit before getting access to the FEMA data. See
Melinda Deslatte, Ater Seeking Lawsuit Against FEMA for Voter Information, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/3539254.html.
Meanwhile, candidates for office were denied access to the government's list of displaced
voters and had to rely on privately created lists that were just as unreliable - if not more so -
than the government's list. See Tidmore, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting one political consultant
as describing these private lists as "helter-skelter-cross-your-fingers-slapped-together-let's-
pray-it's-accurate mail and phone lists").
97. See, e.g., JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, VOTING IN THE FIELD: A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL
WAR 15-17 (1915) (discussing out-of-state satellite voting as a common option for soldiers in
the Civil War); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret
Ballot: Challengesfor Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 500 (2003); Pamela S.
Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right To Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REv.
1345, 1350-51 (2003).
98. See, e.g., Arlo Wagner & Amy Doolittle, Iraqis Vote in 7 U.S. Sites, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2005, at Ai.
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supporters argued, relying on traditional forms of absentee balloting seemed to
turn the logic of voting on its head. Normally, a voter assumes the additional
administrative burden of the absentee procedure in return for the convenience
of voting absentee. Katrina's displaced, by contrast, made no such rational
decision. Asking them to shoulder an additional burden to participate in the
elections-on top of the extraordinary and more immediate hardships they
faced-seemed to violate a fundamental notion of fairness.
99
Yet with the second emergency session dominated by the controversy over
more modest voting reforms, there was no time remaining in the session to
give satellite voting sustained consideration. Instead, black lawmakers
attempted to introduce the provision in a subsequent legislative session in
March 2006. The proposal deadlocked the Committee on Senate and
Governmental Affairs and failed to reach the Louisiana Senate floor.1°°
Although supportive committee members argued vigorously for satellite
voting, opponents defeated the measure in part by making the legally dubious
claim that, by adopting satellite voting in select cities with the largest
populations of evacuees, the legislature would run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause and would issue "an invitation to litigation in every sense of the
word.""1 ' Other opponents, such as the treasurer of the state Republican Party,
summarized his opposition to satellite voting by bluntly declaring: "This is
absurd; it goes too far."1 2
The legislature's refusal to permit satellite voting meant that the state's
post-Katrina emergency plan was controversial for what it failed to provide.103
Some civil rights groups- including the NAACP Legal Defense Fund-
continued with litigation alleging that the state's rejection of satellite voting
99. Some voters openly expressed this sentiment. See Brian Thevenot & Leslie Williams, 2,190
Cast Early Ballots in New Orleans Elections, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 11, 20o6, at
Ai (quoting one sixty-two-year-old retiree as saying, "I lived in New Orleans all my life. I
worked in New Orleans. I paid taxes. I bought a home. I've been a good citizen. I shouldn't
have to go out of my way to vote.").
too. See Ed Anderson, Panel Sinks Out-of-State Vote Bill, TIMiES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar.
30, 2006, at A3.
lOl. See id. Opponents of satellite voting advanced this argument despite the fact that no civil
rights group was threatening litigation if satellite voting were adopted. In fact, satellite
voting was the precise remedy sought by the civil rights groups. See Wallace Petition, supra
note 82, para. 81, at 30.
102. Anderson, supra note loo.
103. In addition to the reforms discussed above, the state's emergency plan consisted largely of a
voter information campaign to notify displaced citizens of their voting rights, the provision
of additional election commissioners, and the provision of additional voting equipment. See
Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 36-40, at 9-1o.
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constituted an impermissible vote denial under section 2 of the VRA °4 and an
illicit burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution."' s But given the lack of supportive doctrine,1, 6 these
creative legal arguments failed to convince the court that the legislature -by
refusing to do more -violated statutory or constitutional authority.
10 7
The basket of legislative reforms thus remained modest. Displaced voters
would be exempt from first-time absentee voter rules, would avoid the direct
disenfranchisement associated with the annual voter canvass, and would be
permitted to vote early at selected sites within the state. In addition, the
legislature authorized the Secretary of State to outline a plan to conduct a voter
information campaign to reach the displaced. Yet as this Section has
104. Section 2'S statutory mandate closely traces the Fifteenth Amendment, ensuring that
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.
42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (2000). Despite the Act's first-generation success, minority voters were still
thwarted from succeeding in the political process by institutional design reforms; Congress
and the courts have thus applied this statutory mandate to questions of institutional design.
The lack of minority political success is not by itself a sign of illicit state action. See City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, il n.7 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (noting that "cancelling] out" black votes constitutes a
"mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls"). Instead, the confluence of specific
factors, coupled with a lack of minority political success, triggers section 2's protection. See
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 5O-51 (1986); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 US.C.C.A.N. 177, 2o6-07 (listing the seven factors relevant to finding a
section 2 violation). The courts were instrumental in developing what became the section 2
test. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (sth
Cir. 1973), affd sub noma. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per
curiam). The "Zimmer factors" were largely adopted by Congress during the 1982
amendment process. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 689 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
105. See Brief for Plaintiffs, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 20o6).
io6. Multifactor tests designed by Congress and the Supreme Court to ferret out discrimination
in redistricting cases have made section 2 a doctrine-less vehicle outside of a narrow band of
circumstances. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 104, at 689. For a discussion of how
section 2 has essentially become a boutique doctrine, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1663, 1674 (2oo). See also Heather K. Way,
Note, A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the Argument for the
Incorporation of Section 2, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1439, 1474 (1996) ("In order to succeed [under
section 2], a party must be organized, possess adequate financial resources, and acquire a
large amount of historical and technical documentation....").
107. See Minute Entry, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2006) (noting the
court's decision to dismiss the consolidated cases without prejudice).
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demonstrated, many of these reforms were contested, and some were initially
rejected before a combination of political pressure and threatened judicial
intervention prompted the legislature to adopt them. The legislature's actions
hardly demonstrated an eagerness to accommodate Katrina evacuees, and its
limited emergency reforms seemed to constitute the bare minimum needed to
conduct post-disaster elections. Whether these reforms would preserve
minority voting power was a question for section 5 preclearance to resolve.
B. The Preclearance Paradox
With the legislative reform process completed, Louisiana sought to preclear
its emergency plan with the DOJ. The DOJ had been expecting the state's
submission and had even contacted state officials immediately after Katrina to
promise to "expedite the review of any and all submissions of voting changes"
to deal with Katrina's aftermath. ' s
The state's reforms were subjected to the static benchmarking test to
ensure that its voting changes did not retrogress minority political power.
When faced with Louisiana's post-Katrina emergency voting plan, however,
the static benchmarking test fell apart and deprived the DOJ of the ability to
make any credible threat to deny preclearance. To understand this breakdown,
it is helpful to retrace the simple procedural steps that defined the static
analysis. First, the static test used Louisiana's pre-Katrina voting laws (applied
to the post-Katrina state of affairs) as the benchmark for comparison. It then
compared the state's proposed emergency voting plan (also applied to the post-
Katrina state of affairs) against this benchmark and asked whether minority
voters would be better off with the reforms than without them.0 9 Predictably,
the test concluded that the state's voting reforms were ameliorative, implying
that minority voting power would increase as a result of the emergency plan.11°
This conclusion is undoubtedly correct in a narrow sense: the procedural
reforms, combined with the voter information campaign, would increase
minority voting strength relative to an election held without the reforms.
108. Letter from Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Al Ater, La. Sec'y of
State (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/Ia_katrina.htm.
iog. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Rep. John Conyers, Jr.,
Ranking Minority Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary 3-5 (Mar. 16, 20o6) (on file
with author) ("[T]he sole Section 5 inquiry is whether New Orleans voters would be better
off without... [the] provisions enacted by the State to ameliorate voting conditions for the
displaced individuals.").
11o. See id. at 2-3.
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Yet a closer look reveals a critical lapse in the static analysis. The pre-
Katrina laws, if used for a post-Katrina election, clearly would have led to a
dramatic reduction in minority voting power. For instance, residency
requirements alone would have disenfranchised a substantial portion of the
hundreds of thousands of displaced residents living outside the state.11 The
DOJ was nevertheless doctrinally bound to use the anachronistic pre-Katrina
laws as a benchmark. The use of this benchmark essentially predetermined the
outcome of the static test: compared to the pre-Katrina plan, virtually any post-
Katrina plan would appear ameliorative, even one that led to a substantial
decrease in minority voting power from pre-Katrina levels. This result rendered
the retrogression standard a nullity and undermined the usefulness of the static
test as a workable barometer of illicit reductions in minority voting power.
It was a critical assumption built into the static benchmarking procedure
that preordained this result: static benchmarking presumes that a jurisdiction's
existing voting laws will preserve minority voting strength. 12 In most cases,
this assumption is unproblematic; as long as the circumstances in the
jurisdiction do not dramatically change, existing laws will likely maintain
minority influence. However, the logic of static benchmarking breaks down if
the test's animating assumption is called into question by an intervening event
that renders the existing voting plan unable to preserve minority voting
strength.
To illustrate, imagine a jurisdiction that allows citizens to vote only by
mail." 3 Under normal circumstances and under the existing laws, minority
citizens in the jurisdiction consistently wield enough voting influence to elect
six out often members of the city council. Now imagine that a disaster hits this
jurisdiction and cripples the Postal Service in predominantly minority
neighborhoods. As a result of the damage to this crucial election infrastructure,
minority participation would predictably suffer-compared to their usual six
city council seats, minority voters might, for instance, control only three.
Simply stated, the predisaster plan would fail to preserve minority political
power.
Static benchmarking would nevertheless use this deficient plan as a valid
benchmark for comparison when a post-disaster law was submitted for
preclearance. As long as the new law made voters relatively better off-for
iii. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
112. See Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 26, at 1214; Karlan, supra note 26, at 21.
113. The state of Oregon currently employs a variation of this mail-only voting system. See OR.
REv. STAT. § 254-465(1) (2005) ("An election held on the date of the primary or general
election shall be conducted by mail.").
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instance, by permitting alternative forms of voting-the government would
deem it ameliorative and would grant preclearance. This result would occur
despite the real possibility that the new law might stop short of maintaining
minority control of six council seats. The new regime might instead result in
minority control of only four seats-clearly an improvement over the three
seats the existing laws would provide in a post-disaster election, but also fewer
than the six seats that had long characterized minority political power in the
jurisdiction. The precleared law could thus appear ameliorative relative to the
broken benchmark but still result in an unmistakable retrogression in minority
influence from its predisaster level. This wrinkle in static benchmarking's
normally straightforward logic exerts a crippling effect on section 5's ability to
avoid reductions in minority political power.
14
The above scenario epitomizes a longstanding concern about static
benchmarking" 's When confronted with complex circumstances such as an
unprecedented disaster, the procedure's one-dimensional analysis, often seen
as its principal strength,"6 becomes a decisive weakness. Instead of preventing
clearly retrogressive outcomes, static benchmarking unwittingly blesses them.
The DOJ's posture during the post-Katrina preclearance process reflected
this paradox. The Justice Department admittedly held no leverage over
Louisiana "7 and had no choice but to preclear any plan, no matter how
uncharitable, that improved the pre-Katrina voting laws. To its credit, the DOJ
used its communications with Louisiana officials to encourage the state to
include particular voting procedures. ,8 Yet had the state declined the DOJ's
advice out of hand, it would still have received preclearance. This paradox
makes section 5 a paper tiger in the aftermath of an unprecedented disaster. It
gives the DOJ the veneer of coercive power without actually empowering it to
withhold preclearance from anyone except the "incompetent retrogressor."119
Also, without the threat of a preclearance denial, jurisdictions that might
normally legislate "in the shadow of the law" to gain section 5 approval are
114. I am indebted to Robert Scott for helpful discussions on this point.
115. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
ii6. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 54, at 1657-58.
117. Although the DOJ rarely discloses the reasoning behind its preclearance decisions, the
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights strongly suggested that the Department was
doctrinally disarmed by section 5's static test. See Letter from William E. Moschella to Rep.
John Conyers, Jr., supra note lo9, at 3.
118. See id. at 4-5 (recounting the procedural actions the DOJ encouraged the state to take).
119. Justice Scalia coined this phrase in Bossier Parish 11, 528 U.S. 320, 332 (2000). It refers to "a
jurisdiction that has intended-but failed-to effect a retrogression" in minority political
power. Donahue, supra note 54, at 1661.
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effectively freed from any substantive obligations under the provision. A
jurisdiction may then choose to take only minor steps to avoid retrogression,
knowing that section 5 no longer has the potential to fall like the "sword of
Damocles."
III. RETROGRESSION RECONSIDERED
Having identified a troubling blind spot in section 5's administration, I
now propose a doctrinal "fix" to resurrect section 5's post-disaster enforcement
power. This Part presents an alternative to the static benchmarking test that is
actually capable of upholding the modest retrogression principle announced by
the Court in Beer.
A. Dynamic Benchmarking
Although static benchmarking has long defined section 5's administration,
nothing in Beer or its progeny suggests that it is mandated. Instead, the single
lodestar of section 5's administration is the retrogression standard-the
promise that minority voting power will never backslide, or retrogress, as a
result of new voting laws. Because static benchmarking is incapable of
enforcing this retrogression standard after a disaster, I propose a more effective
"dynamic benchmarking" alternative. 2 '
The dynamic benchmarking model comprises two steps. The first step
applies a multifactor threshold examination of existing voting laws to ensure
that they are capable of preserving minority voting strength. If the existing
laws cannot preserve this strength, the DOJ or district court will be barred
from using them as a valid benchmark. The second step then mandates that the
DOJ or district court develop a "replacement benchmark" - a model voting
plan that, if used in a post-disaster election, would give minority voters a
realistic opportunity to preserve their voting strength. These steps enable
dynamic benchmarking to reject post-disaster voting plans that are technically
120. It is important to emphasize that the dynamic proposal I advance is limited to disaster
situations. Although the proposal might seem like a nuanced alternative to the static test's
blunt application, expanding its application beyond disasters -to reach situations in which,
for instance, gradual changes in demographics reduce minority voting strength-would
likely outstrip section 5's constitutional mandate. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983
(1996) (plurality opinion) (cautioning that the retrogression standard is "not a license for
the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued minority electoral success"
(emphasis omitted)).
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ameliorative compared to predisaster laws yet actually result in illicit
retrogression.
i. Assessing the Existing Voting Regime
The first step in dynamic benchmarking is a threshold examination of a
jurisdiction's existing voting laws to determine whether they are truly capable
of maintaining existing minority voting strength. The DOJ or district court
should be empowered to question the workability of existing voting laws in
light of an intervening event, such as a storm or terrorist attack. A logical
trigger for this initial examination is a federal disaster declaration under the
Stafford Act.'21 To ensure a principled review, the inquiry should be guided by
clear factors including, but not limited to: (i) the extent of voter displacement,
(2) damage to the infrastructure and channels of election administration, and
(3) racial disparities in voting patterns that would be exacerbated by the
existing plan. These factors, which are briefly discussed below, are meant to
signal the kind of broad threshold inquiry sought by dynamic benchmarking.
By investigating each factor, the DOJ or district court should gain an accurate
sense of the extent of democratic damage caused by a disaster.
First, the extent of voter displacement-a concept that includes the number
of displaced voters, their geographic locations, and the projected duration of
displacement-can have a direct impact on whether existing voting laws can
adapt to a post-disaster election. For instance, although a jurisdiction's strict
absentee voting requirements may normally make sense as an anti-fraud
mechanism, after a disaster, these once-reasonable restrictions can erect a
substantial administrative barrier for displaced voters who wish to vote from
afar.
Second, measuring potential damage to the infrastructure and channels of
election administration can help determine whether existing laws can
logistically execute a fair contest. A disaster has the potential to cause
significant damage to critical infrastructure, such as the Postal Service, that
voters rely upon to receive information both from the government and from
candidates seeking their votes. A voting regime that relies primarily on the
Postal Service to distribute voter information -and, more importantly,
absentee ballots-will be hamstrung if this normally stable channel is closed or
disabled after a disaster. In addition to damaging the Postal Service, disasters
can also destroy the places where citizens have become accustomed to voting.
The need to eliminate or consolidate polling locations can contribute to the
121. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2000).
1141
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
conclusion that existing voting plans are inadequate to maintain status quo
voting power, particularly if minority voters are disproportionately affected by
the damage.
Finally, a localized analysis of voting patterns, such as a racial group's
preference for certain methods of voting, can illuminate the extent to which
existing voting laws would be unable to maintain minority voting power. For
example, if a jurisdiction's minority residents have historically disfavored
absentee voting relative to the rest of the jurisdiction's voters, a voting plan's
heavy reliance on absentee voting as the only alternative to traditional voting
should be viewed skeptically. Of course, in the aftermath of a disaster, the DOJ
may not be able to conclude that a jurisdiction's minority voters disfavor a
particular form of voting because they are racial minorities. Nevertheless, the
existence of racially divergent voting preferences should itself counsel caution
when considering whether a voting scheme is capable of preserving minority
voting strength.
This type of multifactor analysis will not be overly burdensome for the
covered jurisdictions, the DOJ, or the district court. The covered jurisdictions
will be charged with producing the necessary data for the analysis but will be
aided by the proliferation of data-driven studies that normally follow a major
disaster. '22 The DOJ or the district court will be responsible for conducting the
inquiry, but both have consistently proved capable of digesting and
synthesizing complex data pertaining to voting plans and voting groups.'23 In
particular, the DOJ, as first among equals in enforcing section 5, has deep
experience with the racial dynamics in the covered jurisdictions. It can continue
to rely on its informal network of elected officials and community activists for
help with the intensely localized post-disaster review that dynamic
benchmarking demands." Thus, although dynamic benchmarking's threshold
inquiry is not costless, it also does not pose a substantial burden.
122. Numerous post-Katrina studies were published in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
See, e.g., KEVIN McCARTHY ET AL., RAND GuLF STATES POLICY INST., THE REPOPULATION OF
NEW ORLEANS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA (2006); Logan, supra note 7.
123. See, e.g., Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 485, 486 cmts. (Jan. 6, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 51 (2006))
(asserting that the DOJ can base a section 5 determination "on the appraisal of a complex set
of facts"); Donahue, supra note 54, at 1672 ("[E]xamination of the Department's past
enforcement practices reveals a rich history of localized and nuanced review.").
124. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 725 (noting the role that local stakeholders already play in
advising the DOJ during its preclearance process); Donahue, supra note 54, at 1675 ("The
Department maintains files with names of minority contacts in particular jurisdictions and
routinely reaches out to these individuals in evaluating the likely impact of a specific
change.").
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If the threshold inquiry demonstrates that the existing voting plan is an
acceptable baseline for comparison, then the DOJ or district court should
proceed with the traditional static benchmarking procedure. A proposed voting
change can then be safely measured against the existing voting plan to detect
retrogression. However, if the threshold inquiry demonstrates that the existing
voting plan is in fact incapable of preserving minority voting strength, the DOJ
or district court should proceed to the second step of the dynamic
benchmarking model.
2. Selecting a Replacement Benchmark
The second step in the dynamic process requires the DOJ or the district
court to select a replacement benchmark-a concrete voting plan that would
likely preserve minority political power in a post-disaster world. Importantly,
the replacement benchmark would not be a "license for the State to do
whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued electoral success."'2 Rather,
the replacement benchmark would only ensure that a minority group's
"opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished. '26 The
distinction is slight, but important: the replacement benchmark is not a
mandate to guarantee political spoils; it should only present minority voters
with a realistic opportunity to avert retrogression. For example, if minority
voters have historically used their political power to elect a minority
representative, the replacement benchmark should be a voting plan that
preserves a realistic opportunity to continue that success. It should not,
however, stack the voting deck in order to turn that opportunity into an
absolute certainty- a potential violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'27
If a proposed voting change improves or simply maintains minority
influence relative to the replacement benchmark, it warrants preclearance. But
if the proposed change falls short of the replacement benchmark-for instance,
by suggesting post-disaster reforms that are too modest to preserve minority
power-it should be denied preclearance. Under dynamic benchmarking, the
fact that a post-disaster plan is technically ameliorative no longer guarantees
125. Vera, 517 U.S. at 983 (emphasis omitted).
126. Id.
127. Even though compliance with the VRA can be a compelling government interest, the state
must still narrowly tailor its actions to withstand strict scrutiny. See Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 922 (1995) ("Where a State relies on the Department's determination that race-
based districting is necessary to comply with the Act, the judiciary retains an independent
obligation in adjudicating consequent equal protection challenges to ensure that the State's
actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.").
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preclearance. By establishing a replacement benchmark, the dynamic model
only preclears voting plans that are sufficiently ameliorative.
How should the DOJ or district court go about choosing this replacement
benchmark? One option that leaps to mind would set the benchmark at the
level of minority voting strength in the last predisaster election. So, returning
to an earlier example, if a jurisdiction's minority voters previously elected six
out of ten city council representatives, a post-disaster voting plan would be
precleared only if it provided the realistic opportunity for that level of success
in a post-disaster election. Intuitively simple, this practice would present the
benchmark as a general goal that the jurisdiction's procedural reforms must
make possible. I nevertheless reject this option because I believe such general
mandates grant undue deference to incumbent lawmakers who may have a
vested interest in developing mediocre voting reforms after a disaster. A
general benchmark, void of specifics, presents substantial situational ambiguity
that these lawmakers can exploit. With the pressure to compromise among
competing interests (not all of which are necessarily legitimate or well
intentioned), incumbents may choose to present the "least best" solution to
maintain minority voting strength and may scuttle better alternatives in the
process. This distrust is particularly justified in the section 5 context, in which
historical anxieties of potential voting discrimination still linger.
In light of this concern, I believe a more appealing and robust approach
would give the DOJ or district court ultimate authority to craft a detailed
replacement benchmark. Yet instead of carving a benchmark from whole cloth,
my proposal would mandate that the DOJ or district court harness the
expertise-and self-interest- of local stakeholders before deciding on an
alternative.128 The stakeholders may include community advocates, political
parties, incumbent lawmakers, candidates for elected office, and any other
organized group or individual who wishes to submit a proposal for an
appropriate replacement benchmark. 29 Similar to amici in formal judicial
128. Heather Gerken has envisioned a similar role for local stakeholders in her proposal to reform
section 5's administration. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 717. Though Gerken's proposal
operates in a different manner from that of this Note, the role she develops for local
stakeholders is both powerful and transferable to other contexts, including dynamic
benchmarking review. Though the idea of involving stakeholders in voting rights
administration is relatively new, involving private parties in other areas of regulation has
long been an area of innovation. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLAL. REv. 1 (1997).
129. The post-Katrina involvement of stakeholder groups suggests that, far from being
disorganized after a disaster, these groups will be fully engaged in the legislative process.
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proceedings,'3° these stakeholders should be encouraged to offer concrete
proposals to inform the review process. The DOJ or district court should then
make those proposals available for public critique and analysis. As a formal
matter, all submitted plans should be considered equally; if a covered
jurisdiction wishes to submit a proposal, it should not be granted special
deference. Doing so would permit jurisdictions to determine the very yardstick
against which their actions would later be measured. Special deference might
also discourage other stakeholders from submitting their own proposals, as it
would connote a hierarchy in which they were disfavored.
Three distinct benefits would flow from openly soliciting local
stakeholders' input. First, and most practically, the DOJ or district court could
use the various submissions to gather practical information on voting
procedures that would be feasible in the aftermath of a disaster. The
stakeholders would be likely to deploy their superior local knowledge to
present procedures that were more creative and workable than what the DOJ or
district court could conceive from afar. And even if the DOJ or district court
did not adopt a submitted plan in its entirety, input from stakeholders would
still present a menu of options from which a replacement benchmark could be
derived. The DOJ already consults local stakeholders informally when
considering whether to preclear voting changes."' The stakeholder submission
process would simply bring this consultation above ground.
Second, an open submission process could promote moderation among
various stakeholders. Because the proposals would be publicly available for
review, stakeholders with conflicting interests might be less likely to submit
unnecessarily generous or stingy examples of a nonretrogressive plan. The
built-in contrast would not, of course, synchronize the stakeholders' conflicting
interests, but it could help blunt the edges of their proposals, lest they
demonstrate bad faith in front of the DOJ or district court.
Finally, consulting local stakeholders addresses the potential criticism that
dynamic benchmarking might "exacerbate the 'substantial' federalism costs
that the preclearance procedure already exacts." '132 The dynamic model
acknowledges superior local knowledge in election administration, which is a
deeply rooted fixture of federalism. It then uses the open submission process to
capitalize on that knowledge and to increase the chance that the replacement
130. See, e.g., LULAC v. Perry, No. 2:03-CV-354, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2006) (remedial
order) (noting the court's request for amici to submit proposed redistricting plans for
consideration on remand).
131. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 726; Donahue, supra note 54, at 1674-75.
132. Bossier Parish 11, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266,
282 (1999)).
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benchmark will enjoy some measure of local "buy-in" or support. 33 Thus, the
procedure strikes a compromise: it uses local consultation to guide the DOJ or
district court's free hand as it crafts a replacement benchmark, but it also
avoids overly constraining the discretion these federal actors need to ensure a
post-disaster response that will maintain sufficient minority political strength.
There is admittedly no perfect solution to the inherent suspicion that attends
giving any government actor-federal or state- discretionary power. Yet by
providing an opportunity for substantial collaboration between local
stakeholders and the federal government, the open submission process
encourages an outcome that reflects both local involvement and federal
stewardship.
3. Exiting Dynamic Benchmarking: One Front Door, One Back Door
The mechanics of dynamic benchmarking ensure that it will be a temporary
procedure. As a covered jurisdiction returns to normalcy, the extraordinary
post-disaster voting laws will not automatically be used as a benchmark when
new laws are submitted for preclearance. Dynamic benchmarking prescribes
conducting the same two-step procedural review, querying whether the
emergency voting laws are an accurate proxy for minority voting strength.
Continuously scrutinizing the replacement benchmark is critical because it
provides a procedural exit from the more exacting mandate that dynamic
benchmarking establishes in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. As
displaced residents decide to return home or to relocate permanently, and as
the covered jurisdiction repairs its election infrastructure, extraordinary post-
disaster voting procedures should give way to more ordinary procedures. 13
To illustrate, consider a jurisdiction that responds to a disaster by
automatically distributing absentee ballots to all displaced voters. Under static
benchmarking, this charitable law would be enshrined as a benchmark. Any
future attempt to scale it back would likely be tagged as a retrogressive change.
This scenario could provide a notable disincentive to jurisdictions considering
whether to adopt aggressive post-disaster voting reforms.
133. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 710 (discussing this potential to "generate bottom-up support
for voting rights enforcement").
134. Reducing the benchmark of minority voting power is not a betrayal of the retrogression
standard. Displaced residents who have taken affirmative steps to relocate (for instance, by
registering to vote in other states) should not be included in the VRA's section 5 analysis.
Dynamic benchmarking should not artificially attach their citizenship to communities they
no longer consider home.
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By contrast, under dynamic benchmarking, the jurisdiction would be
allowed to recalibrate its voting procedures without running headfirst into a
preclearance denial. The dynamic test's threshold inquiry would examine
whether the emergency law is still needed to preserve minority voting strength.
If the absentee ballot distribution process is needed to maintain this strength, it
should be kept as the proper benchmark for the analysis. If it is not so
needed-for instance, because minority voters have largely returned home and
can vote in person without sacrificing their status quo political power-a less
demanding replacement benchmark should be developed to complete the
inquiry. This is the "dynamic" core of the model I propose: rather than
employing a stubbornly fixed benchmark, the model permits upward or
downward adjustment to preserve minority voting strength.
Even though dynamic benchmarking provides for this "front door"
procedural escape from the model's high post-disaster standard, an inherent
limitation leaves open a "back door": a jurisdiction may avoid the procedure's
heightened mandate altogether by leaving its voting laws unchanged. This
alternative "exit" results from a simple truth about section 5: while the
provision has long maintained the coercive power to influence a jurisdiction
that is taking action, section 5 is not equipped to combat the danger of
inaction.13s In other words, section 5 cannot force a jurisdiction to pass a law; it
can only grant or deny preclearance to laws that have already been enacted. The
democratic process can potentially deter such recalcitrant behavior ex ante or
punish it ex post, but in communities that might reward defiance, other tools
in the voting rights arsenal, such as section 2 of the VRA,', 6 will have to take
the lead when a jurisdiction opts to leave its laws unchanged after a disaster.
Though section 2 currently lacks well-developed doctrine to address this kind
of tactic, a discerning court would almost certainly view such calculated
inaction harshly and might be willing to declare that, without reform, the
existing voting laws impermissibly diluted minority voters' ability to
"participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."' 37 Thus, exploiting this limitation in dynamic benchmarking would be
a high stakes game for a covered jurisdiction and would likely present a classic
Hobson's choice: forced to decide between leaving its voting laws unchanged
(a high-risk, low-payoff option) and conforming to the mandate of dynamic
135. I am indebted to Natalie Hershlag for helpful conversations on this point.
136. See supra note 104.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 19 73(b) (2000). Indeed, the potential that the Louisiana State Legislature would
leave its voting laws unchanged formed the basis of Judge Lemelle's repeated threats to
intervene and "to take over (the] elections" - presumably by finding that Louisiana had
violated section 2 of the VRA. Shuler, supra note 83.
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benchmarking, a jurisdiction would likely opt to reform its laws and obtain
preclearance.
B. Support for Dynamic Benchmarking
Dynamic benchmarking is an attractive alternative because it fits easily
within the firmly rooted mechanics of section 5 preclearance and makes
alterations to the existing process only when needed to return section 5 to its
intended strength in the aftermath of a disaster. Although the model offers an
original approach to section 5 enforcement, it finds substantial support in the
VRA's legislative history and in previous departures from static benchmarking.
This support, in turn, would insulate the proposal from adverse judicial review
if Congress embraced dynamic benchmarking as an alternative to the static
test.
1. Legislative History
As discussed earlier,' 3s the Beer Court used the VRA's legislative history to
justify the retrogression standard. 39 The Beer majority referenced a single
passage from a House of Representatives report that framed the section 5
inquiry around whether minority political power was "augmented, diminished,
or not affected" by a proposed voting change. 4 ' Thus, the identification of a
retrogressive law rested on movement in minority power. The Court relied on
static benchmarking to detect this movement, later asserting that the test
flowed "by definition" from the logic of retrogression. ,4,
Yet the same congressional report that the Beer Court referenced did not
endorse static benchmarking as the only way to detect retrogression. Indeed,
the House report explicitly encouraged an inquiry that went beyond whether
minority political power was augmented, diminished, or not affected by a
proposed voting change. Read in full, the report specifically commands that
the inquiry be conducted "in view of the political, sociological, economic, and
psychological circumstances within the community proposing the change."
1 42
Although omitted from the Beer Court's opinion, this language supports a
more nuanced approach to detecting retrogression. Dynamic benchmarking
138. See supra Section I.B.
139. See 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976).
140. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 6o (1975)).
141. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471,478 (1997).
142. H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 60.
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offers such an approach by accounting for potentially disparate circumstances
before determining whether a proposed law will increase, decrease, or maintain
minority voting power. Static benchmarking, by contrast, has never aspired to
incorporate broad-based factors into its analysis. I offer this expanded reading
of the House report not to rehash old debates about the Beer Court's curious
treatment of a thin slice of legislative history, '43 but rather to engage the Court
on its own terms. Drawing support from the same source used to validate the
original retrogression standard highlights dynamic benchmarking's appeal as a
justifiable addition to section 5 and encourages Congress to view the procedure
as a logical extension, not a rejection, of Court precedent.
2. Previous Departures from Static Benchmarking
The adoption of the dynamic model would not be the first departure from
the static benchmarking test. The static test has been notably shelved in three
previous scenarios when existing voting laws failed to provide an appropriate
benchmark for comparison.
First, in Mississippi v. Smith,'" the district court held that an existing voting
plan should not be used as a benchmark for comparison when the plan has
been declared unconstitutional. Instead, the court asserted, a court-ordered
plan drawn in the absence of a workable existing plan should become the
proper benchmark for section 5 preclearance.1 4' The use of the court-ordered
plan meant that the State of Mississippi could be denied preclearance for a
proposed plan that, while ameliorative compared to its existing
(unconstitutional) plan, was retrogressive when compared to the court-ordered
plan.146 The court went on to state that "[ilt would be entirely inconsistent
with the teaching of Beer to suggest that the Court must accept a statutory plan
that increases black voting strength to a lesser degree than a court-ordered plan
in effect."'14 7 The court-ordered plan in Smith thus resembles the dynamic
143. Jurists and commentators alike have long criticized the Beer Court's treatment of the VRA's
legislative history. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, in
Bossier Parish II sharply commented that the Beer Court "sought to justify the imposition of
a nontextual limitation [on section 51 .. by relying on a single fragment of legislative
history." 528 U.S. 320, 363 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
went on to call the Beer Court's reliance on the House report "an act of distorting
selectivity." Id.; see also Katz, supra note 64, at 1198.
144. 541 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal dismissed, 461 U.S. 912 (1983).
145. See id. at 1333.
146. See id.
147. Id.
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procedure's replacement benchmark, and the court's holding supports the
notion that preclearance can be denied if a proposed plan appears retrogressive
compared to a replacement benchmark.
Second, in Vilkes County v. United States, 48 the three-judge district court
again departed from static benchmarking because the county's existing voting
plan was malapportioned. The county, which was 47% black, sought
preclearance of its plan to replace its existing single-member districts with an
at-large voting scheme. 49 The district court rejected the county's argument
that the change was not technically retrogressive because black voters were
effectively prevented from electing candidates of their choice under the existing
single-member districting plan. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the existing
districts are severely malapportioned, it is appropriate, in measuring the effect
of the voting changes, to compare the voting changes with options for properly
apportioned single-member district plans."' s Thus, because the existing
voting plan was malapportioned, the Wilkes County court was willing to apply a
replacement benchmark against which a proposed plan would be measured.
Like Smith, this case demonstrates that Beer does not mandate that the DOJ or
the district court use an existing voting plan as a benchmark if doing so would
undermine the purposes of the retrogression standard.
Finally, in City of Richmond v. United States,'s' the Supreme Court permitted
a limited departure from static benchmarking when faced with a proposed
annexation. Broadly speaking, an annexation-the incorporation of new
territory into a political entity -qualifies as the kind of change covered by
section 5 preclearance because of its potential to cause a retrogression in
minority political strength. For instance, a city may choose to annex new
territory with predominately white voters to reduce the relative strength of its
black voters.
City of Richmond presented a situation in which the annexation of new
territory reduced Richmond's 52% black majority to a 42% black minority.152
Under Richmond's at-large system of elections," 3 and with Richmond's
citizens voting almost exclusively along racial lines, the change meant that
black candidates would be unable to win elections in the post-annexation city.
148. 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1978), affd mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
149. See Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act?, 21 STETSON L. REv. 847, 858 (1992).
iso. Wilkes County, 450 F. Supp. at 1178.
151. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
152. Id. at 363.
153. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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The Court recognized this potential retrogression but also acknowledged that
the static benchmarking test would automatically "forbid all such
annexations,"1 s4 even if a jurisdiction had a legitimate reason to seek new
territory. The Court's desire to permit the "natural" growth associated with
annexations was thus in direct tension with its duty to protect minority voting
strength under section 5.
Faced with this quandary, the Court abandoned static benchmarking
altogether and struck a compromise that would permit the annexation only if
the city agreed to reform its at-large voting scheme and to adopt a ward system
that would give black candidates the chance to win elections in majority-black
districts.15 The Court refused to use the city's existing voting plan as a
benchmark because any annexation would appear retrogressive in comparison;
in its place, the Court employed the compromise plan. If the city refused to
adopt the single-member districts envisioned in this replacement benchmark,
its proposed annexation would be denied preclearance. But if the city adopted
the basket of reforms contained in the replacement benchmark, its proposed
annexation would be granted preclearance."s6
Read together, Smith, Wilkes County, and City of Richmond indicate a
judicial willingness to depart from static benchmarking when the existing
voting plan is an inappropriate basis for comparison. The dynamic
benchmarking procedure that I propose shares the underlying rationale of
these cases, which thereby provide it with a strong foundation of court
precedent that will help it withstand judicial scrutiny.
C. Applying Dynamic Benchmarking to Post-Katrina Louisiana
How would the dynamic benchmarking test have assessed Louisiana's
post-Katrina voting plan? Most indications suggest that the procedure would
have led to a preclearance denial. Under the first step of the dynamic test, the
DOJ (or district court) would have reviewed the existing voting laws to
determine whether the laws could preserve minority voting strength after the
disaster. Evidence such as the extensive voter displacement, damage to the
Postal Service and polling locations, and minority voters' historic aversion to
154. City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371.
155. See id. at 369-70.
156. Although City of Richmond predates Beer by a year, the Court has consistently applied this
flexible test when faced with section 5 annexation questions. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v.
United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 186
(198o).
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traditional mail-based forms of absentee voting'5 7 would likely have led the
DOJ to conclude that the existing voting plan was too broken to be used as a
benchmark. It was beyond dispute that a post-Katrina election held under the
pre-Katrina voting plan would have rendered minority voters decidedly worse
off in terms of political power.
Under the second step of the dynamic test-finding an appropriate
replacement for the broken benchmark-the DOJ would have solicited the
input of stakeholders who had attempted to influence the Louisiana State
Legislature's crafting of the emergency voting plan. By seeking their input, the
DOJ would have given these stakeholders an equal voice in lawmaking,
resurrecting ideas that might have been dismissed in the legislative process and
freeing them from the pressure to bargain from a position of weakness.
For Louisiana, the solicitation process inevitably would have focused
attention on the major flash point in the post-Katrina debate: whether out-of-
state satellite voting was necessary to prevent retrogression in minority political
power. Major civil rights groups had vigorously lobbied the legislature and
sought to convince the public that out-of-state satellite voting should be the
cornerstone of any post-Katrina voting plan. But the legislature instead opted
for more conventional tactics to accommodate displaced voters."l 8 Dynamic
benchmarking would nevertheless have empowered the DOJ to determine
whether satellite voting was a necessary plank in a post-disaster voting plan.
All sides of the debate would have had the opportunity to make their case in
the open submission process before the DOJ reached its decision.
157. See Thevenot & Williams, supra note 99 (noting pronounced post-Katrina distrust of
absentee balloting among African-Americans). Before Katrina, in Orleans Parish, which
includes the city of New Orleans and the majority of black voters, only 3.3% of all votes cast
in the 2004 presidential election were by absentee ballot. See La. Sec'y of State, Election
Results by Precinct-Official, Results for Election Date: 11/02/04 Presidential Electors,
Orleans Parish, http://www.sos.louisiana.gov:8ogo/cgibin/?rqstyp=elcmpct&rqsdta=
1102040101714136 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). This percentage is low compared to that in
other states. See David Kimball & Martha Kropf, Early and Absentee Voting and
Unrecorded Votes in the 2002 Midterm Election 23 (2004), http://www.umsl.edu/
-kimballd/mpsao 4kk.pdf.
158. This failure to enact out-of-state satellite voting may reflect the fact that the era of "normal
politics" has not yet arrived in Louisiana. See Gerken, supra note 65, at 709 (defining
"normal politics" as a world in which "racial minorities finally wield enough power in the
political process to protect themselves"); see also Pildes, supra note 33, at 97 (suggesting that
we have reached the "normal, pluralist interest group politics to which the VRA aspired").
Minority voters may still be "discrete and insular" participants in the political process,
requiring vigilant protection under section 5 to avoid consistent defeat. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (calling for a "more searching judicial inquiry" for
"discrete and insular minorities"). Alternatively, the demise of satellite voting could reflect a
flaw in the proposal.
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Informed by the available post-Katrina data and liberated from static
benchmarking's rigid constraints, the DOJ would likely have concluded that
satellite voting, or an equally robust reform, was necessary to avoid
retrogression.1 9 With a demanding replacement benchmark in place, Louisiana
would have been required to adopt further remedies to reduce the likelihood
that minority influence would wane after Katrina. A proposed plan that did not
meet this mandate would have been rejected out of hand.
This conclusion is supported by data from the 2006 New Orleans
municipal elections. The percentage of black voters in the city's electorate
dropped from 63% in the 2002 municipal elections to 57% in 2006.'6 Although
at first glance this decline might not appear precipitous, it is a historically
"substantial" shift for a city the size of New Orleans. 6, In addition, a more
granular look at the election data reveals deeply troubling traces of
retrogression.
The first disquieting trend shown in the data is that, although overall voter
participation declined between 2002 and 2006, the New Orleans electorate
shrunk primarily due to the nonparticipation of black voters displaced by
Katrina. 62 District-level data reveal that, after Katrina, voting rates among
these minority voters plummeted. For instance, in the predominately black
Lower Ninth Ward, voter participation declined by nearly 40%.63 New
Orleans East, another predominantly minority neighborhood, experienced a
23% decline in participation.' 6, Similar declines appeared in other
predominantly minority neighborhoods with substantial populations of
displaced citizens. By contrast, in majority-white neighborhoods that endured
massive devastation, such as Lakeview, voter turnout was generally stable
relative to 2002, declining only 6.4%, an outcome that may reflect existing
159. The DOJ's concession that Louisiana "may well have done more under the circumstances"
shows its awareness that Louisiana opted against more drastic steps to preserve minority
voting strength. Letter from William E. Moschella to Rep. John Conyers, Jr., supra note lO9,
at 3.
16o. John R. Logan, Population Displacement and Post-Katrina Politics: The New Orleans
Mayoral Race, 20o6, at i (June 1, 20o6), http://www.s4.brown.edu/katrina/report2.pdf.
161. Brian Thevenot, Flood-Ravaged Neighborhoods May Lose Clout, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), May 2, 20o6, at Al (quoting John Logan).
162. See Adam Nossiter, Vote for Mayor Points to Change in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2006, at Ai.
163. Logan, supra note 16o, at i.
164. Id.
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disparities among the displaced. 16, In majority-white neighborhoods with
minimal disaster damage, such as the French Quarter, voter turnout increased
by 22.5% compared to 2002.166
Table i.
2006 VOTER TURNOUT IN SELECT MAJORITY-BLACK AND MAJORITY-WHITE DISTRICTS 
6 7
DITRC NM TTL OES % O@ 200 % AMGE %BLC
Majority-Black Districts
Lower Ninth Ward 3360 62.2 92.6 95.7
New Orleans East 17,8 76.9 99.2 86.8
French Quarter 2106 122.5 12.2 13.3
L~dvi w 979Q9 93.6 So82._3
Uptown-Carrollton 20,691 103.8 6o.9 46.6
The implications of this sharp divergence in political participation are
potentially severe. John Logan, a Brown University sociologist and preeminent
authority on post-Katrina demographics, concluded that "neighborhoods with
the highest electoral participation have likely strengthened their hands in the
battles over public investment and development planning that are sure to be a
165. John Logan posited that "extensive voter mobilization by civic groups" contributed to this
"exceptional turnout" in majority-white neighborhoods. Id. at 15. Yet these communities
were also likely to be wealthier, to be more rehabilitated, and to have displaced residents
living closer to New Orleans than majority-black communities. See supra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text.
166. Logan, supra note 16o, at 16 tbl.9.
167. I generated this table (and a later table) with data originally analyzed by John Logan. See id.
at 2, 9-10 (identifying his methodology). The districts included in both tables are the
districts that Logan predicted would experience a relative increase or decrease in their
political influence due to their voter participation rates. See id. at 24.
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major feature of local politics in the next several years."' 68 Speaking to the
Times-Picayune, Logan sounded a more dire warning:
People have interests tied to specific territories. If you happen to be an
African-American in the French Quarter, your vote doesn't have the
same impact as an African-American in eastern New Orleans [where
storm damage was severe] .... The Lower 9 th Ward and New Orleans
East were very under-represented in the election.... I firmly believe
that as decisions are made about allocating resources, that the resources
will follow the votes. Politicians don't usually serve the city or the
public as a whole; they have to be concerned about how they're going
to maintain an electoral majority. 6 9
Thus, a steep decline in minority participation may preface a tremendous
decline in minority voters' ability to hold sway in the political process- a factor
that Justice O'Connor deemed to be directly relevant in determining the
existence of retrogression. 
17o
A second unsettling trend seen in the data is that minority voters attempted
to avoid a reduction in their longstanding political dominance by retreating
into racial camps and voting along racial lines. Indeed, it is difficult to explain
the sudden shift in black voting preferences any other way. The eventual victor,
the black incumbent Mayor, Ray Nagin, went from receiving less than 40% of
the black vote in 2002 to being favored by 8o% of black voters in 2006, when
he was paired against a white challenger, Lieutenant Governor Mitch
Landrieu.' 7' Nagin's support among white voters, by contrast, plummeted
from 84% in 2002 to 20% in 2006.72 According to Logan, this "sea change in
the composition of support for [Nagin]" was a "countervailing force" that
blunted the impact of widespread minority voter displacement.' 73 Rather than
support the election of a progressive white mayor, black voters instead
168. Id. at 12.
169. Thevenot, supra note 161 (quoting Logan).
170. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003). Though Congress overturned Ashcroft's
central holding in its recent reauthorization of the VRA, it limited its abrogation of Ashcroft
to the redistricting context. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 15 (2006) ("With regard to
redistricting plans, [the reauthorized VRA] protect[s] naturally occurring districts that have
a clear majority of minority voters."). Parts of Ashcroft arguably remain good law, including
its implication that a decline in minority influence over substantive decision-making is an
indication of retrogression. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 482.
7l. Tidmore, supra note 5.
172. Id.
173. Logan, supra note 16o, at 19, 24.
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consolidated their votes behind a conservative black incumbent whom they had
previously disfavored.' 74 Although this type of racial bloc voting is not-by
itself-a sign of retrogression, its reappearance represents a retreat from
progress and a step backwards from the type of cross-racial understanding the
Court has consistently identified as the goal of the VRA. 
17
Table 2.
NAGIN VOTE SHARE BY DISTRICT'
7 6
Majority-Black Districts
Lower Ninth Ward 39.9 83.3 94.3
New Orleans East 54.7 71.3 86.9
French Quarter 70.5 25.2 27.3
Uptown-Carrollton 65.2 40.5 39.9
Less than six months after the 2006 municipal elections, and only one year
since Katrina made landfall, it is still too early to catalogue the full extent of
minority voters' post-Katrina decline in political power. I present this post-
election data only to support my earlier assertion that the DOJ justifiably could
have predicted that Louisiana's emergency voting plan would not provide
minority voters with a realistic opportunity to avoid retrogression. Admittedly,
given the extent of devastation and displacement caused by Katrina, it might
have been impossible for any set of voting procedures to avoid an absolute
174. See Kim Cobb & Kristen Mack, Nagin Revels in His Unconventional Win, HOUSTON CHRON.
May 22, 20o6, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/3878784.html ("Nagin is a pro-
business, conservative Democrat who has been known to support Republican candidates.
Landrieu, on the other hand, is a liberal Democrat of the old school.. .
175. See, e.g., Ashcrofi, 539 U.S. at 490.
176. See supra note 167.
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decline in minority voting strength. Under the worst circumstances, even the
most accommodating post-disaster jurisdiction might have only realistically
hoped to minimize retrogression.17 Yet two larger points remain. First, as the
DOJ stated, Louisiana "may well have done more under the circumstances" to
accommodate displaced citizens.178 Second, because of static benchmarking's
inability to operate effectively after a disaster, section S would have been
powerless to prevent Louisiana from doing even less to preserve minority
voting strength. Only a procedure like dynamic benchmarking could have
compelled the state to adopt further reforms.
CONCLUSION
With Hurricane Katrina as a tragic backdrop, this Note has endeavored to
illuminate a crucial shortcoming in section S of the Voting Rights Act. The
cornerstone of section 5's preclearance process- the static benchmarking test-
is incapable of protecting minority voting power in the aftermath of a disaster.
The procedure's "sixth-grade" arithmetic proved inappropriate in a post-
disaster world that demanded a more complex calculus. Section 5 is not,
however, unconditionally wedded to static benchmarking; as I have shown,
both its legislative history and case law support an alternative approach, such
as the dynamic benchmarking test offered by this Note.
Although the Court has thus far played a dominant role in defining the
scope of section S, dynamic benchmarking is ideally a congressional innovation.
Two considerations- one tactical, one normative -justify a legislative strategy.
First, while a sympathetic court could read dynamic benchmarking into section
S, minority voters lack standing to prompt judicial intervention under the
provision. 79 To get into court, a jurisdiction would have to opt for judicial
preclearance of its post-disaster laws, a highly unlikely choice given the time
and expense required by that alternative.o
Second, while Katrina-like disasters are inherently unpredictable and are
likely to be rare, this is no excuse for inaction. Waiting until the next
177. The dynamic model I propose recognizes this reality by mandating only that a jurisdiction
design a plan that provides minority voters with their best opportunity to avoid
retrogression, not a plan that guarantees its avoidance altogether. See supra Subsection
III.A.2. Section 5 cannot plausibly mandate that a covered jurisdiction do more without
stretching the provision beyond its constitutional limitations. See supra note 127.
178. Letter from William E. Moschella to Rep. John Conyers, Jr., supra note 1O9, at 3.
179. Cf. Way, supra note 1o6, at 1443 n.17 ("[I]n contrast to actions under 5 5, cases under § 2 can
be initiated by private parties in addition to the Justice Department.").
i8o. See supra note 70.
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catastrophe to act on lessons learned from past disasters is illogical. Hoping
instead that there will not be another disaster implicating section 5 is simply
imprudent. In the spirit of the vigorous debate in the legal academy on
emergency constitutionalism,18' Congress should approve the dynamic model
as a legitimate alternative to static benchmarking- before the next disaster
strikes. Congress may choose to revisit the recently reauthorized section 5
altogether, '8 2 which would provide an opportunity to consider a limited
innovation like dynamic benchmarking.
Ultimately, congressional action to adopt dynamic benchmarking will
simply modernize-not revolutionize -section 5. The proposal admittedly
weaves new doctrine into an old quilt, but this intentional modesty further
justifies the proposal. It demonstrates that dynamic benchmarking is no
stalking horse for a permanent expansion of section 5; instead, the model
purposefully echoes the simple request made by countless Katrina survivors
that their hard-fought political power not recede with the flood waters. In
other words, these survivors asked for nothing more than to be protected
against retrogression in their political power. That level of protection has long
been section 5's central promise. Dynamic benchmarking seeks only to make it
unconditional, come hell or high water.
181. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Laurence
H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, TheAnti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 18ol (2004).
182. The recent congressional reauthorization and carefully placed additional comments in the
Senate Judiciary Committee's VRA reauthorization report have only increased speculation
that section 5 may be headed toward constitutional challenge. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 25
(2006) (additional views of Sens. Cornyn and Coburn) ("[T]he record of evidence does not
appear to reasonably underscore the decision to simply reauthorize the existing Section 5
coverage formula-a formula that is based on 33 to 41 year old data . . . [T]he seemingly
rushed, somewhat incomplete legislative process involved in passing the legislation
prevented the full consideration of numerous suggested improvements to the Act."). For
background on the section 5 constitutionality debate, see Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section
Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
725 (1998); Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne:
The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 769 (2003); and Paul Winke, Why
the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally
Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 69 (2003).
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